Three Men Indicted in $345 Million Consumer Debt Ponzi Scheme
September 26, 2018
On September 19, a federal grand jury indicted three men on charges of conspiracy, wire fraud, identity theft and money laundering in connection with a $345 million ponzi scheme, tracing back to January 2013, according to the U.S. Department of Justice.
Simultaneously, the SEC obtained a court order to shut down the ponzi scheme allegedly created by these men, Kevin B. Merrill, 53, Jay B. Ledford, 54, and Cameron Jezierski, 28. The SEC complaint alleged that these men attracted investors to their scheme by promising sizable profits from the purchase and resale of consumer debt portfolios. However, the defendants were allegedly fabricating documents and forging signatures in a complex scheme to entice investors and perpetuate the fraud.
The SEC complaint alleges that Merrill and Ledford stole at least $85 million from investors to maintain lavish lifestyles, spending millions of dollars on luxury items, including $10.2 million on at least 25 cars, $330,000 for a 7-carat diamond ring, $168,000 for a 23-carat diamond bracelet, millions of dollars on luxury homes, and $100,000 to a private fitness club.
According to a story from WBAL TV, a Baltimore-area NBC news affiliate, SEC employee Stephanie Avakian said that from one investor’s $500,000 investment, “Merrill allegedly used [it] for a $400,000 payment for a 2014 Bugatti sports car, made payments to prior investors and repaid $20,000 of his own credit card debt.”
According to the WBAL TV story, a related complaint filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, alleges that the investors included small business owners, restaurateurs, construction contractors, retirees, doctors, lawyers, accountants, bankers, talent agents, professional athletes and financial advisers in Maryland, Washington, D.C., Northern Virginia, Las Vegas, Texas and elsewhere.
“Most of these investors are just learning that they have been victimized,” said U.S. Attorney Robert K. Hur. “The effects of this kind of fraud can be devastating. We urge anyone who thinks they may be a victim to contact the FBI at MerrillLedford@fbi.gov.”
If convicted on the criminal charges, Merrill and Ledford could face up to 262 years in prison and Jazierski could face up to 120 years in prison.
The Madden Decision, Three Years Later
February 18, 2018
At first, reversing the 2015 Madden v. Midland Funding court decision, which continues to vex the country’s financial system and which is having a negative impact on the financial technology industry, seemed like a fairly reasonable expectation.
The controversial ruling by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, which also covers the states of Connecticut and Vermont, had humble roots. Saliha Madden, a New Yorker, had contracted for a credit card offered by Bank of America that charged a 27% interest rate, which was both allowable under Delaware law and in force in her home state.
But when Madden defaulted on her payments and the debt was eventually transferred to Midland Funding, one of the country’s largest purchasers of unpaid debts, she sued on behalf of herself and others. Madden’s claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was that the debt was illegal for two reasons: the 27% interest rate was in violation of New York State’s 16% civil usury rate and 25% criminal usury rate; and Midland, a debt-collection agency, did not have the same rights as a bank to override New York’s state usury laws.
In 2013, Madden lost at the district court level but, two years later, she won on appeal. Extension of the National Bank Act’s usury-rate preemption to third party debt-buyers like Midland, the Second Circuit Court ruled, would be an “overly broad” interpretation of the statute.
For the banking industry, the Madden decision – which after all involved the Bank of America — meant that they would be constrained from selling off their debt to non-bank second parties in just three states. But for the financial technology industry, says Todd Baker, a senior fellow Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a principal at Broadmoor Consulting, it was especially troubling.
“The ability to ‘export’ interest rates is critical to the current securitization market and to the practice that some banks have embraced as lenders of record for fintechs that want to operate in all 50 states,” Baker told AltFinanceDaily in an e-mail interview.
A 2016 study by a trio of law professors at Columbia, Stanford and Fordham found other consequences of Madden. They determined that “hundreds of loans (were) issued to borrowers with FICO scores below 640 in Connecticut and New York in the first half of 2015, but no such loans after July 2015.” In another finding, they reported: “Not only did lenders make smaller loans in these states post-Madden, but they also declined to issue loans to the higher-risk borrowers most likely to borrow above usury rates.”
With only three states observing the “Madden Rule,” the general assumption in business, financial and legal circles was that the Supreme Court would likely overturn Madden and harmonize the law. Brightening prospects for a Madden reversal by the Supremes: not only were all segments of the powerful financial industry behind that effort but the Obama Administration’s Solicitor General supported the anti-Madden petitioners (but complicating matters, the SG recommended against the High Court’s hearing the case until it was fully resolved in lower courts).
Despite all the heavyweight backing, however, the High Court announced in June, 2016, that it would decline to hear Madden.
That decision was especially disheartening for members of the financial technology community. “The Supreme Court has upheld the doctrine of ‘valid when made’ for a long time,” a glum Scott Stewart, chief executive of the Innovative Lending Platform Association – a Washington, D.C.-based trade group representing small-business lenders including Kabbbage, OnDeck, and CAN Capital — told AltFinanceDaily.
Even so, the setback was not regarded as fatal. Congress appeared poised to ride to the lending industry’s rescue. Indeed, there was rare bipartisan support on Capitol Hill for the Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017 — better known as the “Madden fix.”
Introduced in the House by Patrick McHenry, a North Carolina Republican, and in the Senate by Mark Warner, Democrat of Virginia, the proposed legislation would add the following language to the National Bank Act. “A loan that is valid when made as to its maximum rate of interest…shall remain valid with respect to such rate regardless of whether the loan is subsequently sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred to a third party, and may be enforced by such third party notwithstanding any State law to the contrary.”
Just before Thanksgiving, the House Financial Services Committee approved the Madden fix by 42-17, with nine Democrats joining the Republican majority, including some members of the Congressional Black Caucus. Notes ILPA’s Stewart: “We were seeing broad-based support.”
But the optimism has been short-lived. The Madden fix was not included in a package of financial legislation recently approved by the Senate Banking Committee, headed by Sen. Mike Crapo, Republican of Idaho. Moreover, observes Stewart: “Senator Warner appears to have gotten cold feet.”
What happened? Last fall, a coast-to-coast alliance of 202 consumer groups and community organizations came out squarely against the McHenry-Warner bill. Denouncing the bill in a strongly worded public letter, the groups — ranging from grassroots councils like the West Virginia Citizen Action Group and the Indiana Institute for Working Families to Washington fixtures like Consumer Action and Consumer Federation of America – declared: “Reversing the Second Circuit’s decision, as this bill seeks to do, would make it easier for payday lenders, debt buyers, online lenders, fintech companies, and other companies to use ‘rent-a-bank’ arrangements to charge high rates on loans.”
The letter also charged that, if enacted, the McHenry-Warner bill “could open the floodgates to a wide range of predatory actors to make loans at 300% annual interest or higher.” And the group’s letter asserted that “the bill is a massive attack on state consumer protection laws.”
Lauren Saunders, an attorney with the National Consumer Law Center in Washington, a signatory to the letter and spokesperson for the alliance, told AltFinanceDaily that “our main concern is that interest-rate caps are the No. 1 protection against predatory lending and, for the most part, they only exist at the state level.”
But in their study on Madden, the Stanford-Columbia-Fordham legal scholars report that the strength of state usury laws has largely been sapped since the 1970s. “Despite their pervasiveness,” write law professors Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., and Richard Squire, “usury laws have very little effect on modern American lending markets. The reason is that federal law preempts state usury limits, rendering these caps inoperable for most loans.”
While the battle over the Madden fix has all the earmarks of a classic consumers-versus-industry kerfuffle, the fintechs and their allies are making the argument that they are being unfairly lumped in with payday lenders. “Online lending, generally at interest rates below 36%, is a far cry from predatory lending at rates in the hundreds of percent that use observable rent-a-charter techniques and that result in debt-traps for borrowers,” insists Cornelius Hurley, a Boston University law professor and executive director of the Online Lending Policy Institute. Because of fintechs, he adds: “A lot of people who wouldn’t otherwise qualify in the existing system are getting credit.”
A 2016 Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank study reports that traditional sources of funding for small businesses are gradually exiting that market. In 1997, small banks under $1 billion in assets –which are “the traditional go-to source of small business credit,” Fed researchers note — had 14 percent of their assets in small business loans. By 2016, that figure had dipped to about 11 percent.
The Joint Small Business Credit Survey Report conducted by the Federal Reserve in 2015 determined that the inability to gain access to credit “has been an important obstacle for smaller, younger, less profitable, and minority-owned businesses.” It looked at credit applications from very small businesses that depend on contractors — not employees – and discovered that only 29 percent of applicants received the full amount of their requested loan while 30 percent received only partial funding. The borrowers who “were not fully funded through the traditional channel have increasingly turned to online alternative lenders,” the Fed study reported.
The ILPA’s Stewart gives this example: A woman who owns a two-person hair-braiding shop in St. Louis and wants to borrow $20,000 to expand but has “a terrible credit score of 640 because she’s had cancer in the family,” will find the odds stacked against when seeking a loan from a traditional financial institution.
But a fintech lender like Kabbage or CAN Capital will not only make the loan, but often deliver the money in just a few days, compared with the weeks or even months of delivery time taken by a typical bank. “She’ll pay 40% APR or $2,100 (in interest) over six months,” Steward explains. “She’s saying, ‘I’ll make that bet on myself’ and add two additional chairs, which will give her $40,000-$50,000 or more in new revenues.”
In yet another analysis by the Philadelphia Fed published in 2017, researchers concluded that one prominent financial technology platform “played a role in filling the credit gap” for consumer loans. In examining data supplied by Lending Club, the researchers reported that, save for the first few years of its existence, the fintech’s “activities have been mainly in the areas in which there has been a decline in bank branches….More than 75 percent of newly originated loans in 2014 and 2015 were in the areas where bank branches declined in the local market.”
Meanwhile, there is palpable fear in the fintech world that, without a Madden fix, their business model is vulnerable. Those worries were exacerbated last year when the attorney general of Colorado cited Madden in alleging violations of Colorado’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code in separate complaints against Marlette Funding LLC and Avant of Colorado LLC. According to an analysis by Pepper Hamilton, a Philadelphia-headquartered law firm, “the respective complaints filed against Marlette and Avant allege facts that are clearly distinguishable from the facts considered by the Second Circuit in Madden.
“Yet those differences did not prevent the Colorado attorney general from citing Madden for the broad-based proposition that a non-bank that receives the assignment of a loan from a bank can never rely on federal preemption of state usury laws ‘because banks cannot validly assign such rights to non-banks.’”
Should the Federal court accept the reasoning of Madden, Pepper Hamilton’s analysis declares, such a ruling “could have severe adverse consequences for the marketplace and the online lending industry and for the banking industry generally….”
What Shakeout? Breakout Capital Secures $25 Million Credit Facility
February 8, 2017
Put a tally up on the board for small business lenders in 2017. McClean, VA-based Breakout Capital, which just announced a move into a larger office last week, has also secured a $25 million credit facility with Drift Capital Partners. Drift is an alternative asset management company.
Breakout is young by today’s industry standards, founded only two years ago by former investment banker Carl Fairbank, who is the company’s CEO. And don’t count them out just because they’re not in New York or San Francisco. Washington DC’s Virginia suburbs have become somewhat of a hotspot for fintech lenders. OnDeck, Fundation, StreetShares and QuarterSpot all have offices there, Fairbank points out. “And Capital One is right up the street,” he adds while explaining that the community has a strong talent pool that is familiar with creative lending. Breakout has already grown to about 20 employees and they’re still growing, he says.
Fairbank considers Breakout to be a more upmarket lender, whose repertoire includes serving the near-prime, mid-prime customer. CAN Capital and Dealstruck had focused on this area and both companies stopped funding new business in 2016. As I point this out, I ask if that suggests that segment is perhaps too difficult to make work.
“Candidly, that’s the part of the market that I feel the best about,” he says matter of factly. The company tries to product-fit deals based on the borrower, and will even make monthly-payment based loans. “I think the subprime side with the stacking and the debt settlement companies is a very very difficult place to play right now,” he says, adding that they have worked with subprime borrowers using their original bridge program but that they’ve kind of pulled back from doing those. As with all programs regardless, their goal is to graduate merchants into better or less costly products later on. We have helped merchants move on to get SBA loans, he maintains.
That all sounds very hands on, and part of it is, Fairbank confirms while asserting that technology does indeed do a lot of the legwork. “There’s absolutely a human element to underwriting these deals,” he says. He also agrees with much of what RapidAdvance chairman Jeremy Brown wrote in a AltFinanceDaily op-ed titled, The New Normal. Both Breakout and RapidAdvance refer to themselves as technology-enabled lenders, an acknowledgement that tech is a component of the company, not the entire company itself.
“I think we will see the beginning of the demise of fully automated, no manual touch funding,” Brown wrote in his article.
Brown also predicted that the legal system will ultimately impose order on some industry practices like stacking or that a state like New York could take a public policy interest in products he believes have legal flaws. As he was writing that, Governor Cuomo’s office published a budget proposal that redefined what it means to make a loan in the state. And it leaves much to be desired, some sources contend. Two attorneys at Hudson Cook, LLP, for example, published an analysis that demonstrates how its wording is ambiguous and far-reaching.
“What they really need to do is take the time to think through the implications and basically do a full study of the market to ensure that what they’re pushing forward is going to have the desired consequences,” Breakout’s Fairbank offers on the matter.
This doesn’t mean he’s anti-regulation. The company already holds itself to high standards and customer suitability and is a founding member of the Coalition for Responsible Business Finance.
“I personally do believe that there’s bad forms of lending or cash advances in the market and I’m sure that’s what Cuomo thinks as well but at the same time, it’s getting pushed very quickly and they really really ought to step back and do the research to understand the broader implications and to understand what exactly they’re trying to accomplish,” he maintains.
His pragmatism extends to the OCC’s proposed limited fintech charter, which he finds intriguing, assuming it gets buttoned up. “I believe it’s a concept worth pursuing,” he says, explaining that regulators will need to get comfortable with unsecured lending.
In the meantime, he’s optimistic about Breakout’s prospects. “In a time when institutional appetite for alternative finance companies has dried up, we believe our ability to raise a credit facility in this market speaks volumes about what we have already accomplished, our position as a leading player in the space, and our prospects for strong, but measured, growth,” Fairbank is quoted as saying in a company announcement. The company was also invited and joined the Task Force for the PLUM Initiative, a collaboration between the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Milken Institute to more effectively provide capital to minority-owned businesses throughout the United States. The Task Force consists of a very select group of industry leaders, who are in positions to improve access to capital in underserved markets, according to the announcement.
While other companies are making adjustments or in his opinion, continuing to make questionable underwriting decisions, Fairbank thinks his formula for success works. “I think that we do look at deals differently than most folks because I intentionally built the core of my underwriting team with folks who are not from this space so they take a more traditional approach and mix it with some of the greatest aspects of alternative finance.”
This Startup Wants to Turn Student Lending to Student Investing
July 26, 2016
What if colleges sold education like a service you could pay for based on the value you receive?
The state of student debt begs for alternatives and there is a growing consensus that education should be a tool for employment, and deriving monetary value be based on outcomes. Virginia-based Vemo Education is hoping to convert that thought into a market. The startup provides income-based financial solutions to colleges and universities.
While a crop of alternative student loan lenders like Commonbond and SoFi attract borrowers with cheaper loans and refinancing options, Vemo’s promise is to begin at the start with pricing college better. It is one of the few companies to offer income share agreements to students via colleges. Income Share Agreements (ISA), as the name suggests is a financial instrument where an individual pays a percentage of income for a fixed number of years instead of paying the sticker price of tuition upfront. “When colleges choose to price tuition as a percentage of future income to graduates, the way college is priced changes,” said CEO Tonio DeSerrento.
The concept was first propounded by economist Milton Freidman in his 1955 essay called ‘The Role of Government in Education,’ in which he described ISAs as an ‘equity investment’ in a person’s future, making the lender an investor. He wrote, “Investors could ‘buy’ a share in an individual’s earning prospects: to advance him the funds needed to finance his training on condition that he agree to pay the lender a specified fraction of his future earnings.”
Sounds kind of similar to a merchant cash advance, doesn’t it? It sort of is. ISAs do not have interest rates either, but they do have a time-bound repayment contract, a feature unlike MCA. An individual agrees to pay a fixed percentage of income over a prescribed amount of time irrespective of the principal amount. That means the total cost remains uncertain until it’s fully paid.
The idea is to reduce the risk of a college education by focusing on employment rather than the process of education, which might be more valuable in reducing the barrier to entry and the risk associated with defaults. It also encourages students from picking nontraditional areas to study instead of popular lucrative fields. ISAs also have room for income exemptions where a student does not owe anything below a certain income. And that is what differentiates the 11-month-old startup from a SoFi or a Commonbond, according to DeSerrento, who is actually SoFi’s former deputy general counsel. “CommonBond and SoFi come into the picture after a student has graduated and employed and they help winners of that make more money,” he said. “By the time SoFi comes in, college is already paid for and the value they can add is as a cheaper substitute for federal loans.”
Vemo is led by a bunch of folks with industry experience, including some that have worked at Sallie Mae. The company’s first client was Purdue University which launched the first ISA initiative in the country. Its ISA fund, ‘Back A Boiler,’ will supplement federal loans and private student loans. According to its terms, juniors and seniors are eligible for loans starting at $5,000 factoring in expected future income to be repaid over nine years. Vemo also works with for-profit colleges like coding bootcamps where employment is the end goal. “We work with coding bootcamps where 100 percent of the tuition is paid through vemo as a percentage of their incomes,” he said. “They owe nothing unless they graduate and get a job and tuition price is unknown until you get a job.”
ISAs are different from loans but not always for the better. While ISAs appear to be less discriminatory, whether the legal framework of anti-discriminatory laws apply to ISAs, is to be determined. Secondly, lack of transparency in pricing could fluctuate payments and since repayment is bound by time, one could potentially end up overpaying for a degree. Consumer protection laws around ISAs are also unclear at this time. Seth Frotman, student loan ombudsman for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau warned that unknown upfront costs make it imprecise and difficult to understand the risks involved with such an instrument. Moreover, since repayment is based on income, there is also a fear of ‘creaming’ the best students from elite colleges.
In April 2009, US Senator Marco Rubio proposed a bill titled ‘Investing in Student Success Act’ to institutionalize ISAs as an alternative to student loans. That legislation remains in limbo. But DeSerrento isn’t waiting. Since Vemo’s clients are mostly colleges, his concern with the bill only goes so far as to make ISAs legitimate.
Vemo is venture backed by Fast forward, GS2, University Ventures and Learn Capital who invested $2 million in seed funding last year.
Court Refuses to Apply Federal Preemption to Loan Servicer Despite Bank’s Continued Interest in Loan
January 20, 2016
In November 2014, the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General (“OAG”) filed a complaint against a number of companies that did business with a group of payday lenders. The payday lenders were a Delaware bank and three tribal entities. The defendants provided marketing services and operational support to the lenders and in some instances purchased portions of the loans. In its complaint, the OAG alleged that the defendants, and not the bank or tribes, were the de facto lenders and that their partnership with the bank and tribes were constructed to circumvent Pennsylvania usury laws.
In their motions to dismiss, the defendants argued that, in regards to the loans issued by the Delaware bank, federal law preempted the OAG’s state usury claims. They explained that the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (“DIDA”) allows state-charted federally insured banks to charge the same interest rate in any state as they are legally permitted to charge in the state in which they are located. The DIDA mirrors the language of section 85 of the NBA.
The defendants argued that because the Delaware bank was a state-charted federally insured bank, the DIDA preempted the causes of action in the OAG’s complaint as they pertained to the defendants’ partnership with the bank. As additional support for their preemption argument, the defendants highlighted the fact that the bank not only originated the loans but also retained them wholly, or at least in part.
Despite the bank’s origination and retention of the loans, the District court rejected the defendants’ arguments. It held that federal preemption only applied to the bank. In support of its holding, the court cited to the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Community Bank of Northern Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 295 (3d Cir. 2005). In that case, the Circuit court held that state law claims against a non-bank were not preempted by the DIDA or the NBA.
The District court refused to apply federal preemption to the defendants even though the bank retained ownership of all or part of the loans. The court noted that the complaint alleged that the defendants, and not the bank, were the real parties in interest and therefore reasoned that preemption should not apply.
Pennsylvania v. Think Fin., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4649 (D. Pa. 2016)
Ignoring Cease and Desist Letters – Just Don’t Do It
August 12, 2015
Usury law is complex. It is an area of law heavily burdened with obscure exceptions and antiquated nuances. Yet, one point is clear.
No matter how clear the case law, sophisticated the compliance program or lax the regulator, when a business receives a cease and desist letter from a state or federal authority it must be addressed. To do nothing risks litigation and worse. Case in point is the recent complaint filed by the CFPB against payday lender NDG Financial Corp. and its affiliates.
According to the complaint, NDG received cease and desist letters regarding its lending practices from Michigan (2014), California (2012, 2013, and 2014), Virginia (2013), New Hampshire (2011), Maine (2011), Oregon (2011), and Pennsylvania (2010). And though NDG stopped lending in some of these jurisdictions, it apparently felt confident enough to continue its operations in a number of these states even after receiving the letters. Partly as a result, the Bureau filed suit.
Now, I am in no way suggesting that CFPB will prevail in its claims against NDG or that merely receiving a cease and desist letter is evidence of wrongdoing. As a recent post of mine shows, regulators are often incorrect in their interpretation of usury law. That being said, the number of previous warnings NDG received from state regulators prior to being sued is stunning. So it seems to me that NDG is somewhat responsible for the targeting it has received from the CFPB.
If a lender has received 8 cease and desist letters within a 4 year period, there is a problem. It doesn’t mean it must immediately stop all lending. But it would be wise to undertake a greater review of its operations and, hopefully, generate a plan to address the regulators’ concerns.
Placing one’s head in the sand just won’t cut it.
On Deck Capital IPO, An Insider’s Perspective
August 16, 2014It was August 23, 2011, the day the Virginia Earthquake could be felt all the way up in New York City. The four of us were enjoying outdoor seating at a restaurant on the Upper East Side. The ground shook, my drink spilled and Ace looked at each one of us and said, “Okay so I’m putting you down for five deals this month.” OnDeck Capital’s relationship managers were aggressive. If you were a small Independent Sales Organization (ISO), they didn’t expect to get all of your dealflow so they roped you in little by little. It was hard to say no. If five deals was too much, Ace would say three and if three was too much, then he’d put you down for three anyway. Zero was not in the cards. OnDeck owned a specific niche and if you didn’t send your premium credit clients to them, then any ISOs you were competing against would. That was a death knell in those days. Just a few years earlier I would’ve shrugged them off, but public sentiment was changing. Merchants were embracing the fixed daily payment methodology and the merchant cash advance industry would never be the same.
OnDeck Capital is now going public. Will you buy stock?
I’m in a unique position to discuss OnDeck. I started my career in this industry before they even existed. I’ve competed against them as an underwriter at a rival firm, worked with them as a referral partner when I was in sales, and covered them in my capacity as Chief Editor of an industry trade publication.
I left my post as Merchant Cash & Capital’s Director of Underwriting in late 2008. I was 25, about a year or two older than the average employee in the industry. Several of MCC’s rivals got demolished in the financial crisis but OnDeck wasn’t one of them. They also weren’t much of a competitor either. Struggling to define themselves as the anti-merchant cash advance, their product ran counter to the spirit of the industry’s rise. The single biggest allure of a merchant cash advance wasn’t that it was easy to obtain but that there was no fixed repayment term. The funds came with a pre-determined net cost but no specific date on when the delivery of future sales would be due.
Outsiders like the news media aren’t exactly sure what separates merchant cash advance from OnDeck except for maybe the cost of funds. Cash advance just sounds expensive, doesn’t it?
Outsiders identify the company by three characteristics.
1. They’re a non-bank business lender
2. They’re more expensive than a bank
3. They’re a tech company
These bullet points gloss over the fact that OnDeck’s loans require payments to be made every day. Can you imagine a credit card company forcing you to send a payment every day of the month? Or your landlord asking for rent on the 1st of the month, the 2nd, the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and so on every day until your lease is up?
This is not to say that this system is necessarily bad for borrowers, but that it is quite possibly the most unique and important part of what makes OnDeck different. It’s their secret sauce. It is why OnDeck gets lumped in with merchant cash advance companies in many conversations. OnDeck and the legion of copycats they have spawned are part of a broader industry that includes merchant cash advance companies. I call them daily funders. Daily funders provide financing on the condition that payments are made daily. I don’t call them daily lenders because traditional merchant cash advance products are not made by lenders, but by a unique group of investors that purchase future revenue streams.
Transition
Under company founder Mitch Jacobs, OnDeck had established themselves as the de facto loan option.
The merchant’s not biting on merchant cash advance? Send it to OnDeck. The merchant doesn’t accept credit cards? Send it to OnDeck.
They were every merchant cash advance ISO’s frenemy. They’d solicit you for your deals and then throw you under the bus to journalists as evil purveyors of expensive financing. They needed us to source dealflow and we needed them to maximize closing ratios but neither was quite satisfied with the arrangement.
When the company’s first employee took over as CEO in June 2012, the rhetoric changed. While still happy to be portrayed as the anti-merchant cash advance, OnDeck transformed their image from a niche Wall Street lender to a Silicon Valley-esque tech company. Noah Breslow was a curious choice. He has a BS from MIT and an MBA from Harvard Business School. He’s tall, charismatic, and he introduced vocabulary words such as algorithm to an industry that relied entirely on manual human underwriting.
At a recent lending conference, the younger crowd characterized Breslow as the Steve Jobs of business loans. He commands a cult-like following inside and outside the company, and in 2013 was embraced by New York City’s Mayor Bloomberg.
Breslow fast tracked OnDeck. With only $43 million raised in the first 5 years, the company went on to raise more than $300 million in the first 24 months under Breslow’s leadership.
This was their plan all along
In November 2012, OnDeck entertained a buyout offer from UK-based payday lender Wonga in which they reportedly received a $250 million valuation. The deal fell apart in the late stages but at the time I believed the negotiations were all a ploy for OnDeck to get a true market valuation. With a solid offer on the table, they knew both where they stood and where they needed to go. Last week the WSJ reported that preliminary IPO discussions valued them at $1.5 billion, six times higher than where they were two years ago.
With stock options being offered to new employees at least as far back as 2012, the plan to go public should come as no surprise. Later this year, those employees may actually get to do something very few startup workers ever get to do, convert those options into real shares.
So will OnDeck ride off into the sunset of billion dollar bliss? Not so fast say several industry insiders, some of whom are itching to short the stock on the first day they can.
Smoke and mirrors?
As OnDeck took advantage of the swing in public consensus (that fixed terms were better and lower costs increased the attactiveness ), insiders began to ask an important question. Why weren’t merchant cash advance companies collectively countering with lower prices to remain competitive? Greed was fingered by journalists especially in the wake of the financial crisis. But greed is a weak prerogative if you consider that merchant cash advance companies were filing for bankruptcy left and right in 2009.
And oddly or perhaps even ominously, an entire segment of merchant cash advance companies began to raise their prices just as OnDeck was lowering theirs. When I wrote The Fork in the Merchant Cash Advance Road in April 2011, I said:
While the margins earned on high credit accounts shrank, funding providers were dealing with another challenge simultaneously, defaults. Whether the business owner intentionally interfered with their credit card processing or the store went out of business altogether, bad debt in the MCA world was mounting…FAST!
Risk was and still is the number one reason that merchant cash advances cost so much. While it’s true that OnDeck serviced higher credit businesses, insiders speculated that the spreads were too thin. For years, OnDeck’s merchant cash advance competitors have doubted the soundness of their model.
It’s a debate that continues even to this day and yet OnDeck has secured hundreds of millions in investments from companies like Google Ventures, Goldman Sachs, Peter Thiel, and Fortress Investment Group. Their notes got an investment grade rating from DBRS. And as far as volume is concerned, they have likely eclipsed the industry’s all time reigning giant CAN Capital. If they had reached none of these milestones, OnDeck would have little credibility to convince critics of their sanity.
With a mountain of circumstantial evidence through big name backing in OnDeck’s favor, it seems to be indicative that the skeptics are wrong. But maybe they’re not. Could their model be both seriously flawed and superior at the same time?
It’s all about eyeballs
Going back to the 1990s, Internet companies have been judged, valued, and made famous by the price of eyeballs and the number of site visits. It’s a measure that’s never disappeared and according to USA Today is making a comeback. And while OnDeck Capital has always been based in New York City, true to their Silicon Valley form, their model has been to conquer market share first 
and take on profitability second. In their case, it’s not eyeballs or site visits, it’s loan origination volume.
Five months ago Breslow was quoted in the WSJ as saying OnDeck is “imminently profitable“. With seven years in business, it’s proof that their critics have been right all along, that their model doesn’t make money.
What scares their competitors though, is that this strategy has been intentional. Very few if any players in the industry have had the luxury, guts, or the purse to lose money for seven years as part of a coup to conquer the market. Disbelievers in this long term wildly risky strategy are salivating at the opportunity to inspect the company’s financial statements in the IPO.
In When Will the Bubble Burst?, RapidAdvance CEO Jeremy Brown, whose company became part of the Quicken Loans family last winter, fired shots at OnDeck, “To accomplish high growth rates, which may be driven by a desire or need for an IPO or to raise investment or to sell to private equity, assets are being overpaid for through higher than economically justified commissions (I’ve heard 12-15 points upfront from the more aggressive companies) and stretch the repayment term of the MCA or loan even further (On Deck24, I am talking about you).”
Insiders testify that OnDeck’s strategy has not so much been about lower costs but about growth at all costs. Among the evidence is the sudden removal of an industry-wide practice of verifying the business owner is current on their rent. Repayment terms are getting stretched out, commissions have shot up, and for a while they ran a program that allowed applicants to get funding with the submission of just a single bank statement.
Merchant cash advance companies look at their own default figures and scoff at the notion that OnDeck’s aggressive practices could produce low single digit defaults as they’ve publicly claimed.
Imminent
Through it all, there remains the fact that OnDeck has never claimed their methodologies to be profitable, at least not yet. Red ink at IPO time might reward their detractors with a certain delicious satisfaction, but what will they say if and when they become profitable?
I’m reminded of The 20 Smartest Things Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos ever said. Below is a few of them.
- “There are two kinds of companies: Those that work to try to charge more and those that work to charge less. We will be the second.”
- “Your margin is my opportunity.”
- “We’ve done price elasticity studies, and the answer is always that we should raise prices. We don’t do that, because we believe — and we have to take this as an article of faith — that by keeping our prices very, very low, we earn trust with customers over time, and that that actually does maximize free cash flow over the long term.”
- “If you never want to be criticized, for goodness’ sake don’t do anything new.”
- “Invention requires a long-term willingness to be misunderstood. You do something that you genuinely believe in, that you have conviction about, but for a long period of time, well-meaning people may criticize that effort. When you receive criticism from well-meaning people, it pays to ask, ‘Are they right?’ And if they are, you need to adapt what they’re doing. If they’re not right, if you really have conviction that they’re not right, you need to have that long-term willingness to be misunderstood. It’s a key part of invention.”
I wonder if the executive team at OnDeck would share these philosophies.
They’ve always claimed themselves to be a tech company, much to the bewilderment of their competitors. Will technology come through for them?
The data available on businesses has changed. Bank statements and a credit report might’ve been all there was to go on when the company first started, but in Automated Intelligence Breslow said, “the fact is most businesses operating today, in 2014, are already technology focused to one degree or another. They have computers, they have online banking, they use credit card processors, their customers are reviewing them online, there are public records, etc. All this electronic data helps paint a deeper and more accurate picture of the health of a business.”
With such easy access to important data, it might be possible that through the use of 2,000 data points, OnDeck doesn’t need to do all the manual investigations that their competitors still place high values on. The available data might be able to predict loan repayment success just as well as a human analyst.
And if that’s true, then they can reduce the cost of overhead as they scale. As their predictive algorithms get fed more data, they might be able to eliminate humans altogether. At the May 2014 LendIt conference, Breslow admitted that 30% of their loans were still manually underwritten but said that “if customers want full automation, we are prepared to deliver it.”
By that charge, a sustainable model should not be that far out of reach. Through advanced data analysis and decreasing fixed costs, profitability may indeed be imminent.
Winner
If the story of the merchant cash advance industry has been a race to the top, then OnDeck might be declared the winner in a successful IPO. It would be an ironic achievement for the company that positioned itself as the anti-merchant cash advance. In their wake today are hundreds of daily funders offering fixed payment products.
OnDeck’s critics are in a paradoxical position because a successful IPO is good for them too. They want to believe OnDeck’s model never worked, can’t work, and have it be proven a failure. But if it goes the other way, the legitimacy of the daily funder universe will be solidified in the mainstream. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.
As AmeriMerchant CEO David Goldin said to Inc, “the OnDeck IPO shows that Wall Street is now taking this industry seriously.”
So does that mean he’d buy stock? Somewhere out there at a restaurant in New York City, an OnDeck relationship manager is probably putting Goldin down for five shares.
Cue the earthquake, the industry will never be the same.
Curious how it will change it exactly? Read my magazine published prediction, The Retail Investor.
